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Progress Toward Global Eradication of Dracunculiasis, January 2014–June 2015
Donald R. Hopkins, MD1; Ernesto Ruiz-Tiben, PhD1; Mark L. Eberhard, PhD2; Sharon L. Roy, MD3

Dracunculiasis (Guinea worm disease) is caused by Dracunculus
medinensis, a parasitic worm. Approximately 1 year after a person
acquires infection from contaminated drinking water, the worm
emerges through the skin, usually on the lower limb. Pain and
secondary bacterial infection can cause temporary or permanent
disability that disrupts work and schooling. The campaign to eradicate dracunculiasis worldwide began in 1980 at CDC. In 1986,
the World Health Assembly called for dracunculiasis elimination
(1), and the global Guinea Worm Eradication Program, led by the
Carter Center and supported by the World Health Organization
(WHO), United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF), CDC, and
other partners, began assisting ministries of health in countries where
dracunculiasis was endemic. In 1986, an estimated 3.5 million cases
occurred each year in 20 countries in Africa and Asia (1,2). Since
then, although the goal of eradicating dracunculiasis has not been
achieved, considerable progress has been made. Compared with the
1986 estimate, the annual number of reported cases in 2015 has been
reduced by 99% and cases are confined to four endemic countries.
This report updates published (3–5) and unpublished surveillance
data reported by ministries of health and describes progress toward
dracunculiasis eradication from January 2014 through June 2015.
During 2014, a total of 126 cases were reported from four countries
(Chad [13 cases], Ethiopia [three], Mali [40], and South Sudan
[70]), compared with 148 cases reported in 2013, from the same four
countries. The overall 15% reduction in cases during 2013–2014
was less than that experienced in recent years, but the rate of decline
increased again to 70% in the first 6 months of 2015 compared
with the same period during 2014. Continued active surveillance
with aggressive detection and appropriate management of cases are
essential program components; however, epidemiologic challenges
and civil unrest and insecurity pose potential barriers to eradication.
Because the life cycle of D. medinensis is complex, its
transmission can be interrupted using several strategies (4).
Dracunculiasis can be prevented with four main interventions:
1) educating residents in communities where the disease is

endemic, particularly persons from whom worms are emerging,
to avoid immersing affected body parts in sources of drinking
water; 2) filtering potentially contaminated drinking water
through a cloth filter or pipe filter; 3) treating potentially contaminated surface water with the insecticide temephos (Abate)
to kill the copepods (small crustaceans that host D. medinensis
larvae); and 4) providing safe drinking water from bore-hole or
protected hand-dug wells (6). Containment of transmission* is
* Transmission from a patient with dracunculiasis is contained if all of the following
conditions are met: 1) the infected patient is identified before or within 24 hours after
worm emergence; 2) the patient has not entered any water source since the worm
emerged; 3) a village volunteer or other health care provider has managed the patient
properly, by cleaning and bandaging the lesion until the worm has been fully removed
manually and by providing health education to discourage the patient from
contaminating any water source (if two or more emerging worms are present,
transmission is not contained until the last worm is removed); 4) the containment
process, including verification of dracunculiasis, is validated by a Guinea Worm
Eradication Program supervisor within 7 days of emergence of the worm; and
5) temephos is used if any uncertainty about contamination of sources of drinking water
exists, or if a source of drinking water is known to have been contaminated. All of these
criteria must be achieved for each emerged worm for the case to be considered contained.
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achieved through four complementary measures: 1) voluntary
isolation of each patient to prevent contamination of drinking
water sources, 2) provision of first aid to prevent secondary
infections, 3) manual extraction of the worm, and 4) application of occlusive bandages. No vaccine or medicine to prevent
or treat Guinea worm disease currently exists.
D. medinensis has approximately a 1-year incubation period
(range = 10–14 months) following infection (6). A case of
dracunculiasis is defined as an infection occurring in a person
exhibiting a skin lesion or lesions with emergence of one or
more Guinea worms. Each infected person is counted as a case
only once during a calendar year. Countries enter the WHO
precertification stage of eradication after 1 full year with no
reported indigenous† cases. An imported case is an infection
resulting from ingestion of contaminated water from a source
identified through patient interviews and epidemiologic investigation in a place other than in the community where the patient
is detected and reported (i.e., another country or village within
the same country). Since 2012, no known cases imported from
one country to another have been reported.
In each affected country, a national dracunculiasis eradication
program receives monthly reports regarding cases from each village under active surveillance. Reporting rates are calculated as
the proportion of all villages under active surveillance reporting
†

An indigenous case of dracunculiasis is defined as an infection occurring in a
person exhibiting a skin lesion or lesions with emergence of one or more Guinea
worms in a person who had no history of travel outside his or her residential
locality during the preceding year.

monthly. Active surveillance is conducted in all villages with
endemic dracunculiasis or at high risk for importation, with
daily searches of households for persons with signs or symptoms
of dracunculiasis, to ensure case detection within 24 hours of
worm emergence and prompt patient management to prevent
contamination of water sources. Villages where endemic transmission of dracunculiasis is interrupted (i.e., zero cases reported
for ≥12 consecutive months) are kept under active surveillance
for 3 consecutive years. WHO certifies a country free from
dracunculiasis after that country maintains adequate nationwide
surveillance for ≥3 consecutive years and demonstrates that no
cases of indigenous dracunculiasis occurred during that period.
As of January 2015, WHO had certified 198 countries, areas,
and territories as free from dracunculiasis (3). Eight countries
remain to be certified: four where dracunculiasis is currently
endemic (Chad, Ethiopia, Mali, and South Sudan), two in the
precertification stage (Kenya and Sudan), and two never known
to have had endemic dracunculiasis since the global eradication
program began in 1980 (Angola and the Democratic Republic
of the Congo).
During January 2014–June 2015, CDC evaluated 385
specimens that emerged from humans. Among these, six were
collected in four formerly endemic countries (Ghana, Kenya,
Niger, and Sudan) and the remaining 379 were collected in the
four countries where dracunculiasis remains endemic. In total,
164 specimens (43%) were determined to be D. medinensis, all
of which came from the four endemic countries. Because some
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patients have multiple Guinea worms emerge, more laboratoryconfirmed specimens than cases might be reported.

Country Reports
Chad. Following a decade with no reported cases, Chad
reported 10 cases in 2010, and after indigenous cases were
confirmed over 3 consecutive years, dracunculiasis was declared
to be endemic in 2012 (7,8). In 2014, Chad reported 13 cases
(eight contained) in 11 villages, compared with 14 cases in 2013.
During the first half of 2015, six cases (zero contained) were
reported in six villages, the same as the number of cases reported
in the same period of 2014, four of which were contained. Only
one of the 11 villages that reported a case in 2014 and none of
the six villages that reported a case during January–June 2015
had previously reported a case.
Guinea worm infections in dogs in Chad were first detected
in 2012 and since then, more dogs than humans have been
identified with emerging Guinea worms in this country. This
has not occurred in any other country during the eradication
campaign. Worm specimens obtained from dogs were determined to be genetically indistinguishable from D. medinensis
worms removed from humans in Chad (7). Most infections
during the current outbreak have occurred in communities along
the Chari River. The Carter Center has assisted the Ministry
of Health in implementing active village-based surveillance for
the disease in more than 700 villages in the at-risk zone. The
working hypothesis, based on biologic, environmental, and
epidemiologic investigations by CDC and the Carter Center,
is that the cases in humans and infected dogs are associated
with the domestic and commercial fishing industry along the
Chari River and involve fish or other aquatic hosts that serve as
paratenic hosts (intermediate hosts in which no development
of the parasite occurs). New human cases are thought to occur
when inadequately cooked paratenic hosts are consumed by
humans and when such hosts, including fish and fish entrails,
are consumed raw by dogs (7). Overall, 113 infected dogs were
reported in 2014; during January–June 2015, 302 infected dogs
were reported, a 325% increase over the 71 reported during the
same period in 2014.
Beginning in October 2013, Chad’s Guinea Worm Eradication
Program urged villagers to cook their fish well, bury fish entrails,
and prevent dogs from eating fish entrails. By May 2015, according to monthly sample surveys, this intervention was being
implemented in more than half of the at-risk population in
surveyed communities. In February 2014, efforts began to persuade villagers to tether infected dogs until the worms emerged
to prevent contamination of water and infection of copepods.
Chad has offered a cash reward equivalent to about US$100
for reporting a case of dracunculiasis in humans since before
2010. Since February 2015, a cash reward equivalent to about

US$20 for reporting and tethering infected dogs has been
offered. The Minister of Health visited seven endemic villages
in March 2015 to help mobilize local authorities and villagers
and publicize the cash rewards. Whereas 40% of infected dogs
were tethered in 2014, 70% were tethered during January–
June 2015. As of April 2015, among 127 villages that had an
infected human or dog during 2014–2015, 81 (64%) had at
least one source of safe drinking water. Temephos usage is limited
by the extremely large lagoons used for fishing and as sources of
drinking water; however, starting in August 2014, an innovative
technique of applying temephos to smaller cordoned sections
of the lagoons at entry points used by infected humans or dogs
was introduced and used to protect 19 villages in 2014 and 30
villages during January 2015–June 2015. The Carter Center and
the WHO Collaborating Center for Dracunculiasis Eradication,
Training, and Research at CDC are supporting research to better
understand the unusual epidemiology of the current outbreak
of dracunculiasis in Chad and assess antihelminthic treatment
of dogs to prevent maturation of worms.
Ethiopia. In 2014, Ethiopia reported three cases of dracunculiasis (two contained) in three neighboring villages within
Gog district in Gambella region, a reduction of 73% from the
11 cases reported in 2013. Three infected dogs and one infected
baboon were also reported in the same area in 2014. During
January–June 2015, one case (contained) and one infected dog
were reported in the same area, compared with two cases and
no infected dogs during the same period of 2014. Temephos
was applied in all implicated villages within 7 days of identification of the case and infected animal. A total of 173 villages are
under active surveillance in three districts of Gambella region
with endemic disease. In October 2014, Ethiopia increased the
amount of its cash reward for reporting a case to the equivalent
of US$100.
Mali. Although no cases were reported during the first
6 months of 2014, in the remainder of 2014, Mali’s Guinea
Worm Eradication Program reported 40 cases (88% contained)
in three villages in nomadic localities: Tanzikratene (29 cases)
in Gao region, Nanguaye (10) in Timbuktu region, and Fion
(one) in Segou region. These 40 cases represent a nearly fourfold increase over the 11 cases (64% contained) reported from
eight villages in 2013. The first two villages have no source
of safe drinking water; Fion has one safe source. Temephos
was applied to surface water sources in all three localities soon
after cases began to appear. More than 570 villages are under
active surveillance, including the three villages that had cases
in 2014, although the northern regions of Kidal, Gao, and
Timbuktu are currently experiencing civil unrest and insecurity.
In October 2014, Mali doubled its cash reward to the equivalent of US$100 for reporting a case. As in 2014, no cases were
reported during the first 6 months of 2015.
MMWR / October 23, 2015 / Vol. 64 / No. 41
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South Sudan. The South Sudan Guinea Worm Eradication
Program reported 70 cases of dracunculiasis in 2014, of
which 47 (67%) were contained (Table 1), representing a
38% reduction from the 113 cases reported in 2013. During
January–June 2015, only one case (contained) was provisionally
reported, compared with 19 cases (79% contained) reported
from 13 villages during January–June 2014, a 95% reduction
in cases and a 92% decrease in villages reporting cases (Table 2).
During November 2014–May 2015, South Sudan reported zero
cases. As previously described (4), movements of persons along
multiple routes for seasonal activities such as livestock grazing

and farming, sporadic insecurity created during interethnic
cattle raiding, and other factors have presented unusually complex challenges to this program. In addition, civil unrest and
insecurity that began in December 2013 continued into 2015,
although the area in Eastern Equatoria state with the highest
endemicity was less affected by the insecurity, and coverage with
interventions against transmission of dracunculiasis remains
high (Table 1). In April 2014, South Sudan introduced a cash
reward equivalent to about US$125 for reporting a case of
dracunculiasis and achieved 82% awareness of the reward by
the end of that year (9).

TABLE 1. Reported dracunculiasis cases, surveillance, and status of local interventions in villages with endemic disease, by country —
worldwide, 2014
Country
Ethiopia

Mali†

South Sudan

Total

13
0
(62)
(-7)

3
0
(67)
(-57)

40
0
(88)
(+264)

70
0
(67)
(-38)

126
0
(73)
(-15)

756
(100)
11
0
11

168
(100)
3
2
1

574
(100)
3
0
3

4,700
(100)
37
24
13

6,198
(100)
54
26
28

93
(98)
(98)
(69)
(73)
(99)

3
(100)
(100)
(100)
(100)
(100)

3
(75)
(100)
(100)
(33)
(100)

48
(100)
(96)
(100)
(35)
(100)

147
(99)
(97)
(80)
(60)
(99)

Chad*
Reported cases
Number indigenous, 2014
Number imported,§ 2014
Contained in 2014 (%)
Change in indigenous cases in villages/localities under surveillance, same period 2013 and 2014 (%)
Villages under active surveillance, 2014
Number of villages
Reporting monthly (%)
Number reporting ≥1 case
Number reporting only imported¶ cases
Number reporting indigenous cases
Status of interventions in villages with endemic dracunculiasis, 2014
Number of villages with endemic dracunculiasis, 2013–2014
Reporting monthly** (%)
Filters in all households** (%)
Using temephos** (%)
≥1 source of safe water** (%)
Provided health education** (%)

* Participants at the annual Chad Guinea Worm Eradication Program review meeting in November 2014 adopted “1+ case village” as a new description for villages
in Chad affected by human cases of Guinea worm disease and/or dogs infected with Guinea worms and defined it as “a village with one or more indigenous and/
or imported cases of Guinea worm infections in humans, dogs, and/or cats in the current calendar year and/or previous year.”
† Civil unrest and insecurity since a coup in 2012 continued to constrain Guinea Worm Eradication Program operations (supervision, surveillance, and interventions
in Gao, Kidal, and Timbuktu regions).
§ Imported from another country.
¶ Imported from another country or from another in-country disease-endemic village.
** The denominator is the number of villages/localities where the program applied interventions during 2013–2014.

TABLE 2. Number of reported indigenous dracunculiasis* cases, by country — worldwide, January 2013–June 2015
Cases by year

Cases by period

2014
Country

2013
No.

Chad
Ethiopia
Mali†
South Sudan
Sudan
Total

14
7
11
113
3
148

January–June 2015

No.

Contained
(%)

1-yr change
(%)

January–June 2014*
No.

No.

Contained
(%)

6-mo change
(%)

13
3
40
70
0
126

(62)
(67)
(88)
(67)
(0)
(73)

(-7)
(-57)
(264)
(-38)
(-100)
(-15)

6
2
0
19
0
27

6
1
0
1
0
8

(0)
(100)
(0)
(100)
(0)
(25)

(0)
(-50)
(0)
(-95)
(0)
(-70)

* No reports of cases imported from one country to another were reported during January 2014–June 2015.
† Civil unrest and insecurity since a coup in April 2012 continued to constrain program operations in regions with endemic dracunculiasis (Gao, Kidal, Mopti, and
Timbuktu) during 2014–2015.
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Summary
What is already known on this topic?
The number of new cases of dracunculiasis (Guinea worm
disease) occurring worldwide has decreased each year since
1986, when the World Health Assembly declared global
elimination as a goal, from an estimated 3.5 million in 1986 to
126 in 2014.
What is added by this report?
The number of dracunculiasis cases reported worldwide during
2014 declined by 15% compared with 2013, and by 70% in
January–June 2015 compared with January–June 2014.
Although earlier target dates for global dracunculiasis eradication were missed, progress in eradicating human disease has
accelerated, with only eight human cases reported globally
during January–June 2015. Transmission is ongoing in four
countries: Chad, Ethiopia, Mali, and South Sudan. The emergence of dracunculiasis in domesticated dogs in Chad and
program disruptions caused by civil unrest and insecurity in
Mali and South Sudan are now the greatest challenges to
interrupting transmission.
What are the implications for public health practice?
The Guinea Worm Eradication Program surveillance system and
intervention platform, although challenged by issues related to
civil unrest and insecurity, remains adaptable to local conditions
with a cadre of village volunteers and local supervisors,
supported by regional and national supervisors, National
Guinea Worm Eradication Programs, The Carter Center, the
World Health Organization, and partners. The surveillance
structure in place for dracunculiasis eradication is a potential
model for other community-based surveillance activities and for
control and elimination of other neglected tropical diseases in
sub-Saharan Africa.

Discussion

In 2014, the 126 dracunculiasis cases reported through the global
Guinea Worm Eradication Program were the lowest number ever
reported, and reports from the first half of 2015 suggest that the
total cases in 2015 might be even lower. Ghana, which once reported
the second highest number of cases among all affected countries,
was certified free of dracunculiasis transmission in January 2015.
Despite facing major challenges, South Sudan has reported only one
case in July 2015, compared with 22 in July 2014 and, as a result of
the strong political support and technical leadership of the South
Sudanese program, is on track to become the first among the last
four endemic countries to interrupt transmission.
However, considerable challenges remain. The civil unrest
and insecurity in Mali and South Sudan and the unusual epidemiology occurring in Chad represent the greatest challenges
facing the global campaign. The sporadic infections in dogs
and baboons in Ethiopia are not unprecedented; both these
infections and those in humans seem to be declining.

Although the goals from the 1991 and 2004 World Health
Assemblies to eradicate dracunculiasis globally in 1995 and 2009,
respectively, were not achieved (6,10), considerable progress toward
eradication has been made since 1986. This progress continued
with a modest decrease in cases from 2013 to 2014, and was followed by a 70% decrease in cases during the first 6 months of 2015
compared with the same period in 2014. In 2014, 79% of cases
occurred during the second half of the year, largely because of the
outbreaks in South Sudan during July–August and in Mali during
September–November. From 2013 to 2014, and during January–
June 2014 and the same period during 2015, the number of villages
reporting endemic cases in these four countries decreased by >50%.
Surveillance is a challenge everywhere dracunculiasis exists,
and since March 2012, has been especially weak in dracunculiasis-affected areas of Mali because of civil unrest and insecurity.
With sufficient attention to nationwide surveillance, including
use of cash rewards for reports of rumors of possible cases,
prompt containment of any infections, appropriate interventions, strong political support, and adequate security in the
four remaining endemic countries (Chad, Ethiopia, Mali,
and South Sudan), dracunculiasis will likely become the first
parasitic disease to be eradicated.
1The Carter Center, Atlanta, Georgia; 2Division of Parasitic Diseases and
Malaria, Center for Global Health, CDC; 3Division of Foodborne, Waterborne,
and Environmental Diseases, National Center for Emerging and Zoonotic
Infectious Diseases and World Health Organization Collaborating Center for
Research, Training, and Eradication of Dracunculiasis, CDC.

Corresponding author: Sharon L. Roy, slroy@cdc.gov, 404-718-4698.
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Progress Toward Poliomyelitis Eradication — Afghanistan,
January 2014–August 2015
Chukwuma Mbaeyi, DDS1; Akif Saatcioglu, MD2; Rudolf H. Tangermann, MD2; Stephen Hadler, MD3; Derek Ehrhardt, MPH, MSN1

Despite recent progress toward global polio eradication, endemic
transmission of wild poliovirus (WPV) continues to be reported
in Afghanistan and Pakistan (1,2). The Afghanistan program must
overcome many challenges to remain on track toward achieving the
objectives set in the 2013–2018 strategic plan of the Global Polio
Eradication Initiative (GPEI) (3). Cross-border transmission of
WPV type 1 (WPV1) continues to occur among children traveling
to and from Pakistan (4). The country’s routine immunization system remains weak and unable to reach recommended benchmarks
in most regions; hence, the national Polio Eradication Initiative
(PEI) relies mainly on providing children aged <5 years with oral
poliovirus vaccine (OPV), administered during supplementary
immunization activities (SIAs).* Because of ongoing conflict and
insecurity, some children continue to be missed during SIAs in areas
not under government control; however, the majority of missed
children live in accessible areas and are often unreached because
of a failure to plan, implement, and supervise SIAs efficiently.
This report describes polio eradication activities and progress
in Afghanistan during January 2014‒August 2015 and updates
previous reports (5,6). During 2014, a total of 28 WPV1 cases
were reported in Afghanistan, compared with 14 cases in 2013;
nine cases were reported during January‒August 2015, the same
number as during the same period in 2014. To eliminate poliovirus transmission in Afghanistan, emergency operations centers
(EOCs) need to be established at the national level and in critical
regions without delay to improve overall coordination and oversight of polio eradication activities. The recently revised National
Emergency Action Plan for polio eradication needs to be fully
implemented, including detailed microplanning and enhanced
monitoring and supervision of SIAs, as well as improved crossborder coordination with Pakistan.

Immunization Activities
Estimated national routine vaccination coverage of infants
with 3 doses of oral poliovirus vaccine (OPV3) was 75% in
Afghanistan in 2014, compared with 70% in 2013 (7). The
proportion of nonpolio acute flaccid paralysis (NPAFP)†
* Mass campaigns conducted for a brief period (days to weeks) in which 1 dose
of oral poliovirus vaccine is administered to all children aged <5 years, regardless
of vaccination history. Campaigns can be conducted nationally or subnationally
(i.e., in portions of the country).
† Vaccination histories of children aged 6–23 months with acute flaccid paralysis
who do not test WPV-positive are used to estimate OPV coverage of the overall
target population and to corroborate national reported routine vaccination
coverage estimates.
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cases in children aged 6‒23 months who were reported to
have received ≥3 doses of OPV, which is a proxy indicator for
routine OPV3 coverage, was 64% nationally in 2014, with
wide regional variation: 24% in the conflict-affected Southern
Region, 50% in the Southeastern Region, 63% in the Western
Region, and >70% in the other five regions. The proportion of
children aged 6‒23 months with NPAFP who never received
OPV either through routine immunization services or SIAs
(i.e., “zero-dose” children) was <1% nationally during 2014.
During January 2014‒August 2015, house-to-house SIAs in
Afghanistan targeted children aged <5 years, using different
OPV formulations, including trivalent (types 1, 2, and 3),
bivalent (types 1 and 3), and monovalent (type 1) OPV. During
this period, 41 SIAs were conducted using OPV, including
seven national immunization days (NIDs), six subnational
immunization days (SNIDs), and 28 short-interval, additional
dose, case-response campaigns.§ Additionally, vaccination campaigns were conducted using injectable inactivated poliovirus
vaccine (IPV) in selected parts of districts at high risk for polio
transmission in the Southern and Eastern regions after having gained access during November 2014 and February and
August 2015. Vaccination campaigns were also implemented
at transit points and border crossings with Pakistan as well as
in camps for displaced persons.
Ongoing conflict and insecurity continue to limit access
to children during SIAs, especially in parts of the Southern
and Eastern regions, as well as in Farah Province of the
Western Region. During NIDs conducted in 2015, estimates of children living in temporarily inaccessible areas¶
ranged from 1% to 3% of approximately 9 million children aged <5 years. SIAs in the Southern Region were
further hampered by temporary bans imposed by local
antigovernment groups in the provinces of Helmand
(March‒July 2014 and December 2014‒January 2015) and
Kandahar (June‒early August 2015). However, administrative
coverage and postcampaign monitoring data of NIDs and
SNIDs conducted in 2015 show that a majority of children
not reached during SIAs live in accessible areas. Data from
§ Short-interval, additional dose campaigns are used for case-response vaccination

after detection of a WPV case, or during negotiated periods of nonviolence in
otherwise inaccessible areas, to vaccinate children with a monovalent or bivalent
OPV dose, which is administered within 1–2 weeks of the previous dose.
¶ Areas where vaccination teams are temporarily unable to operate because of
security concerns or bans on vaccination.
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NIDs conducted in March 2015 suggest that 538,412 (7%) of
7,607,067 children targeted during the SIA were unvaccinated,
among whom only 109,017 (20%) were living in inaccessible
areas. During NIDs conducted in May and August 2015,
the proportion of children missed because of inaccessibility
were 32% and 14%, respectively. During these campaigns,
approximately 400,000‒500,000 missed children lived in
accessible areas.
Lot quality assurance sampling (LQAS),** which is used
to assess the quality of SIAs (8), indicates that improvements
noted in 2014 appear to have eroded slightly in 2015. SIAs
in approximately one third of districts assessed were deemed
unsatisfactory, with only 66%‒68% of districts achieving the
desired pass threshold of ≥80% to date in 2015, compared
with 70%‒77% of districts during the same period in 2014.

Uruzgan. These compatible cases indicate that gaps in surveillance quality remain, despite strong overall AFP surveillance
performance indicators.††
Environmental Surveillance. Supplemental surveillance for
polioviruses through sewage sampling began in Afghanistan in
September 2013. Environmental surveillance is currently taking place at 13 sites in five provinces (Kandahar and Helmand
in the Southern Region, Nangarhar and Kunar in the Eastern
Region, and Kabul City in the Central Region). WPV1 was
first isolated from sewage samples in July 2014. Since then, a
total of 25 specimens from seven sites were positive for WPV1.
In 2014, a total of 18 (19%) of 97 sewage specimens tested
positive for WPV1. To date, only seven (8%) of 93 specimens have tested positive in 2015. WPV1 was most recently
detected in sewage samples taken from Helmand Province in
April 2015. WPV3 has not been detected in sewage samples
since environmental surveillance began in Afghanistan.

Poliovirus Surveillance
Acute Flaccid Paralysis (AFP) Surveillance. In 2014, the
annual national NPAFP rate was 12.6 per 100,000 population aged <15 years (regional range = 9.1‒15.5) (Table). The
percentage of AFP cases for which adequate stool specimens
were collected was 92% (regional range = 82%‒98%). Six
AFP cases reported from five provinces were classified as poliocompatible, including one case each reported from Farah,
Helmand, Kandahar, and Kunar, and two cases reported from

Epidemiology of WPV and Vaccine-Derived
Poliovirus (VDPV)
A total of 28 WPV1 cases were reported in 2014, compared with 14 cases in 2013; nine cases were reported
during January‒August 2015, the same number reported
during the same period in 2014 (Figure 1, Figure 2, Table).
During this period, WPV1 cases were reported from 19 (5%)

** A rapid survey method used to assess the quality of vaccination activities after
SIAs in predefined areas, such as health districts (known as “lots”), using a
small sample size. LQAS involves dividing the population into lots and
randomly selecting persons in each lot. If the number of unvaccinated persons
in the sample exceeds a preset decision value, then the lot is classified as having
an unsatisfactory level of vaccination coverage, and mop-up activities are
recommended. If the threshold of ≥80% is met, the area/district is classified
as having “passed,” although mop-up activities might still be indicated in
certain areas.

††

The quality of AFP surveillance is monitored by performance indicators that
include 1) the detection rate of NPAFP cases and 2) the proportion of AFP
cases with adequate stool specimens. World Health Organization (WHO)
operational targets for countries with endemic poliovirus transmission are an
NPAFP detection rate of ≥2 cases per 100,000 population aged <15 years and
adequate stool specimen collection from ≥80% of AFP cases, in which two
specimens are collected ≥24 hours apart, both within 14 days of paralysis
onset, and shipped on ice or frozen packs to a WHO-accredited laboratory,
arriving in good condition (without leakage or desiccation).

TABLE. Acute flaccid paralysis (AFP) surveillance indicators and reported cases of wild poliovirus (WPV) and type 2 circulating vaccine-derived
poliovirus (cVDPV2), by region, period, and poliovirus type — Afghanistan, January 2014–August 2015*
AFP surveillance indicators (2014)

Region
Overall
Badakhshan
Northeastern
Northern
Central
Eastern
Southeastern
Southern
Western

No. of cVDPV2 cases
reported

No. of WPV cases reported
Period

Type

No. of
AFP cases

Rate of
nonpolio
AFP†

% of AFP cases
with adequate
specimens§

Jan–Jun
2014

Jul–Dec
2014

Jan–Aug
2015

WPV1

2,392
52
301
331
397
294
201
426
390

12.6
9.5
14.0
14.1
9.1
15.5
9.8
12.9
15.3

92
98
94
92
97
91
98
82
97

8
0
0
0
0
5
1
1
1

20
0
0
0
0
1
3
16
0

9
0
0
0
0
2
0
2
5

37
0
0
0
0
8
4
19
6

Period
WPV3

Jul–Dec
2014

Jan–Aug
2015

0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0

0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0

0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0

* Data as of August 31, 2015.
† Per 100,000 children aged <15 years.
§ Two specimens collected ≥24 hours apart, both within 14 days of paralysis onset, and shipped on dry ice or frozen packs to a World Health Organization–accredited
laboratory, arriving in good condition (without leakage or desiccation).
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FIGURE 1. Number of cases of wild poliovirus type 1 (WPV1) and circulating vaccine-derived poliovirus type 2 (cVDPV2), by month and year —
Afghanistan, 2012–2015
10
9

cVDPV2
WPV1

8

No. of cases

7
6
5
4
3
2
1
0
Jan Mar

May

Jul

Sep

Nov

Jan Mar

May

2012

Jul

Sep

Nov

Jan Mar

2013

May

Jul

Sep

Nov

2014

Jan Mar

May

Jul

2015

Month and year

of 399 districts in Afghanistan. Among the WPV1 cases
reported in 2014, three cases occurred in children who were
displaced from North Waziristan in neighboring Pakistan,
whereas nearly half (13 of 28) were reported from Kandahar
Province in the Southern Region as part of an outbreak that
began in September 2014. Of the nine WPV1 cases reported
so far in 2015, four occurred in the security-compromised
Farah Province of the Western Region, two were reported
from Nangarhar Province (Eastern Region), whereas Hirat
Province (Western Region), Helmand Province and Nimroz
Province (Southern Region) each reported one case. Of the
37 WPV1 cases reported during January 2014‒August 2015,
26 (70%) were reported among children aged <36 months.
Among these 26 children, eight (31%) had never received
OPV, one (4%) had received a single dose, and 12 (46%)
had received >4 doses. Eight of the nine WPV1 cases thus far
reported during 2015 were in children who never received
OPV through routine immunization services regardless of age.
Based on genomic sequencing, 26 of 28 WPV1 cases detected
in 2014 belong to the R4B cluster known to be also circulating
in neighboring areas of Pakistan; of the two remaining cases,
one (Laghman Province, Eastern Region) belonged to the
R4A cluster, believed to have originated in Pakistan, and the
other (Kandahar Province, Southern Region) belonged to the
R2A cluster, considered indigenous to Afghanistan (9). The
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seven cases reported from the Western and Southern regions in
2015 belong to the R4B cluster that spread from Kandahar in
late 2014; the two cases from Nangarhar are closely matched
and likely linked to cross-border importation from Pakistan.
No polio cases attributable to WPV3 or circulating VDPV§§
have been detected in Afghanistan since April 2010 and
March 2013, respectively.
Discussion

Afghanistan experienced a major setback in its progress
towards the eradication of polio during the period under
review. After having come close to interrupting indigenous
transmission of WPV during 2013 (5), Afghanistan saw a
resurgence in poliovirus transmission in 2014, as the number
of cases doubled from levels reported in the previous year. Thus
far in 2015, few cases have been reported, similar to the pattern
observed during the comparable low transmission season of
2014. However, as the high transmission season approaches,
there is cause for concern regarding the feasibility of interrupting transmission within a year, given ongoing WPV circulation
in areas with known immunity gaps (i.e., areas with suboptimal
§§

VDPVs can cause paralytic polio in humans and have the potential for
sustained circulation. VDPVs resemble WPVs biologically and differ from
the majority of Sabin vaccine–related poliovirus isolates by having genetic
properties consistent with prolonged replication or transmission.
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FIGURE 2. Cases of wild poliovirus type 1, by region — Afghanistan, January 2014–August 2015*
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* Each dot represents one case. Dots are randomly placed within second administrative units.

routine or SIA OPV coverage) in the Southern, Eastern, and
Western regions.
Although there are encouraging signs in the endemic transmission areas of the Southern Region, with no cases reported
from Kandahar, and only a single case reported from each
of Helmand and Nimroz provinces in 2015, vulnerabilities
remain. The neighboring Farah Province in the Western
Region has accounted for nearly half of the cases reported in
2015, frequently involving unvaccinated children. High levels
of population movement between the Western and Southern
regions provide ample opportunities for transmission between
districts in the two regions. Data from short-interval, additional

dose, case-response campaigns and routine immunization
activities indicate the persistence of immunity gaps in both
regions. Despite a small improvement in estimated OPV3
coverage nationally in 2014, routine immunization remained
low in both the Southern and Western regions. Obstacles to
achieving optimal routine immunization coverage in these
regions are largely related to insecurity, poor infrastructure,
and limited access to health services.
LQAS results indicate that the overall quality of vaccination
campaigns in 2015 has declined slightly compared with 2014,
with considerable numbers of children who live in accessible
areas being missed during campaigns. Improving the quality of
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Summary
What is already known on this topic?
Afghanistan is one of the two remaining countries (the other
being Pakistan) where indigenous wild poliovirus (WPV)
transmission has never been interrupted. The Southern Region
has been the main WPV reservoir area in Afghanistan.
What is added by this report?
The number of WPV type 1 cases reported in Afghanistan in 2014
doubled compared with 2013, representing a major setback in
the country’s efforts to eradicate polio. Continued WPV circulation in the polio-endemic transmission zones of the Southern
Region, persistent immunity gaps in the adjoining provinces of
the Western Region, and cross-border transmission in districts
bordering Pakistan in the Eastern Region pose the greatest
challenges to the goal of polio eradication in Afghanistan.
What are the implications for public health practice?
To achieve the goal of polio eradication, urgent action is
required to improve the quality of vaccination activities in
Afghanistan. Accordingly, the government of Afghanistan and
Global Polio Eradication Initiative partners should establish
national and regional emergency operations centers without
delay to manage the coordination and oversight of polio
vaccination and surveillance activities.

SIAs will require better preparation through proper staff training and detailed microplanning, and then ensuring adequate
monitoring and supervision during the course of campaigns.
Additionally, innovative approaches adopted in the National
Emergency Action Plan to reach and vaccinate more children
should be consistently implemented and regularly evaluated
for effectiveness. These approaches include assignment of
permanent polio teams that conduct regular house-to-house
visits for polio vaccination to low-performing districts,¶¶ use
of permanent transit teams to vaccinate children at busy transit
points close to inaccessible areas, and more recently, implementation of a strategy to record, revisit, and vaccinate children not
at home during the initial house visit. Negotiations with local
authorities and persons of influence in insecure and conflictaffected areas with limited or no access during SIAs should
continue while ensuring that the polio program maintains
its neutrality. Cross-border coordination with neighboring
Pakistan must remain a top priority, including the continued
use of permanent transit teams to vaccinate children moving
across the border in both directions.
¶¶

Defined in November 2012, districts with 1) confirmed polio cases in the
previous 2 years, or 2) confirmed polio cases in 1 of the previous 2 years, plus
reported “zero-dose” NPAFP cases in the previous 2 years; <90% estimated
OPV coverage in the previous two SIAs; rejected LQAS in more than one
round of vaccination campaigns; average level of community awareness of
SIAs <50% in previous two SIAs; and inaccessibility.
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The establishment of a national polio EOC in Nigeria
played a crucial role in the country’s successful elimination of
indigenous poliovirus transmission (10). Hence, the national
PEI in Afghanistan will stand to benefit from establishing polio
EOCs nationally and in critical regions to improve overall
coordination of polio eradication activities. In addition, with
the updated and strengthened National Emergency Action
Plan having been finalized to address key vulnerabilities, the
government of Afghanistan must demonstrate the high levels of
commitment needed to interrupt indigenous poliovirus transmission. This commitment must translate into urgent action
that will make the goal of global polio eradication a reality.
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Use of Serogroup B Meningococcal Vaccines in Adolescents and Young Adults:
Recommendations of the Advisory Committee on Immunization Practices, 2015
Jessica R. MacNeil, MPH1; Lorry Rubin, MD2; Temitope Folaranmi, MBChB1,3; Ismael R. Ortega-Sanchez4; PhD;
Manisha Patel, MD1; Stacey W. Martin, MS1

At its June 2015 meeting, the Advisory Committee on
Immunization Practices (ACIP) recommended that adolescents and young adults aged 16–23 years may be vaccinated
with a serogroup B meningococcal (MenB) vaccine to provide
short-term protection against most strains of serogroup B
meningococcal disease. This report summarizes the deliberations of ACIP, the rationale for its decision, and recommendations for use of MenB vaccines in adolescents and young
adults. Two MenB vaccines have recently been licensed by the
Food and Drug Administration (FDA) for use in the United
States and approved for use in persons aged 10–25 years:
MenB-FHbp (Trumenba, Wyeth Pharmaceuticals, Inc.) and
MenB-4C (Bexsero, Novartis Vaccines). Both MenB vaccines
were licensed based on statutory regulations for accelerated
approval (1), which enabled FDA to approve the MenB vaccines for serious or life-threatening diseases based on safety
and demonstration that vaccine effectiveness, as measured by
bactericidal antibody responses with assays using several MenB
test strains that were representative of prevalent strains in the
United States, is reasonably likely to predict clinical benefit. As
a requirement for accelerated approval, confirmatory studies
in the postmarketing period will be conducted to verify and
further describe the effectiveness of the vaccines against an
Recommendations for routine use of vaccines in children, adolescents, and adults are developed by the Advisory Committee on
Immunization Practices (ACIP). ACIP is chartered as a federal
advisory committee to provide expert external advice and guidance to the Director of the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) on use of vaccines and related agents for the control of vaccine-preventable diseases in the civilian population of
the United States. Recommendations for routine use of vaccines
in children and adolescents are harmonized to the greatest extent
possible with recommendations made by the American Academy
of Pediatrics (AAP), the American Academy of Family Physicians
(AAFP), and the American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists (ACOG). Recommendations for routine use of vaccines in
adults are harmonized with recommendations of AAFP, ACOG,
and the American College of Physicians (ACP). ACIP recommendations approved by the CDC Director become agency guidelines
on the date published in the Morbidity and Mortality Weekly
Report (MMWR). Additional information is available at http://
www.cdc.gov/vaccines/acip.

extended number of MenB strains that represent a broader
diversity of endemic disease. Additional postlicensure safety
data are also needed and will be reviewed by ACIP as they
become available.

Methods
The ACIP Meningococcal Vaccines Work Group reviewed
the immunogenicity and safety data from seven clinical trials
of MenB-FHbp (2–5) (Pfizer, unpublished data) and five
clinical trials of MenB-4C (6–10) during monthly teleconferences. The work group evaluated the available published
and unpublished data and evidence regarding meningococcal
disease epidemiology in the United States, carriage, costeffectiveness, immunogenicity, and safety. Based on a literature
search and consultation with the manufacturers, these studies
represent all known clinical trials and evidence for these two
vaccines. A summary of the data reviewed and Work Group
discussions was presented to ACIP, and recommendations for
use of MenB vaccines in adolescents and young adults were
approved by ACIP at its June 24, 2015, meeting (meeting
minutes are available at http://www.cdc.gov/vaccines/acip/
meetings/meetings-info.html).
The type and quality of evidence supporting the use of MenB
vaccines in adolescents and young adults, including college students, was evaluated using the Grading of Recommendations,
Assessment, Development, and Evaluation (GRADE) framework (11,12) (Table 1).

Epidemiology of Serogroup B Meningococcal
Disease Among Adolescents and Young Adults,
Including College Students
ACIP reviewed the burden of serogroup B meningococcal
disease among adolescents, young adults, and college students.
Meningococcal disease is a rare but serious illness and each
case is life-threatening. The United States is currently experiencing a historic low in meningococcal disease incidence
(0.18 per 100,000 among persons of all ages) (CDC, unpublished data, 2013), and the incidence of disease has declined
for all meningococcal serogroups, including serogroup B, a
serogroup not included in the quadrivalent (serogroups A,
C, W, Y) meningococcal conjugate vaccines. The incidence
of serogroup B meningococcal disease is stable and low in
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adolescents and young adults aged 11-23 years, with approximately 50 to 60 cases and five to 10 deaths reported annually;
the majority (>80%) of these cases occur in older adolescents
and young adults aged 16–23 years (CDC, unpublished
data). Seven outbreaks of serogroup B meningococcal disease
have occurred on college campuses since 2009 (range = 2–13
cases), resulting in 41 cases and three deaths. Whereas several
outbreaks of serogroup B meningococcal disease have occurred
in recent years on college campuses, during 2009–2013, the
estimated incidence of serogroup B meningococcal disease
in college students aged 18–23 years (0.09 per 100,000) was
similar to, or lower than, the incidence in all persons aged
18–23 years (0.14 per 100,000), and non-college students aged
18–23 years (0.21 per 100,000) (CDC, unpublished data).
It is estimated that approximately 15 to 29 cases and two to
five deaths could be prevented annually with a routine adolescent MenB vaccination program administered at age 11, 16,
or 18 years (Table 2). A recommendation for college students
only is estimated to prevent approximately nine cases and one
death annually (Table 2).

MenB Vaccine Immunogenicity and Safety
Evaluation of vaccine effectiveness against all serogroup B
meningococcal strains is difficult because the strains are antigenically and genetically diverse. Efficacy studies designed to
assess clinical disease outcomes would be the clearest demonstration of the benefit of MenB vaccines to prevent meningococcal B disease; however, such studies would be difficult
to conduct because of the low prevalence and sporadic occurrence of disease in the United States. Vaccine effectiveness of
MenB-FHbp and MenB-4C, for purposes of U.S. licensure,
was inferred based on an immunologic marker of protection,
serum bactericidal activity with human complement (hSBA) as
measured by assays using selected meningococcal serogroup B
strains. Immunogenicity was assessed as the proportion of
subjects who achieved a fourfold or greater increase in hSBA
titer for each of the serogroup B strains tested, and the proportion of subjects who achieved a titer greater than or equal
to the lower limit of quantification of the assay for all strains

TABLE 1. Summary of evidence for MenB-FHbp and MenB-4C
vaccination of healthy adolescents and young adults, including
college students — United States
Evidence type*
Outcome

MenB-FHbp

MenB-4C

2
4
2

2
3

2
2

2

Benefits
Short-term immunogenicity
Persistence in immunogenicity
MenB immunogenicity with
concomitant vaccination
Harms
Serious adverse events
Serious adverse events following
concomitant vaccination

†

†

* Evidence type: 2 = moderate level of evidence; 3 = low level of evidence;
4 = lowest level of evidence.
† Not assessed because of lack of available data.

(composite response) (13). The lower limit of quantification
was defined as the lowest amount of the antibody in a sample
that can be reliably quantified.
Both MenB-FHbp and MenB-4C vaccines contain components that include factor H binding protein. In two animal
models, antibodies measured after MenB-4C vaccination have
been noted to be cross-reactive with human factor H (14,15).
However, it is not known if auto-antibodies to factor H develop
in humans after vaccination with MenB-FHbp or MenB-4C
and, if auto-antibodies are generated postvaccination, whether
they are of clinical significance. FDA reviewed safety data from
six MenB-4C clinical trials and seven MenB-FHbp clinical
trials, which included approximate totals of 3,100 and 4,500
vaccine recipients, respectively. For most participants who
reported an autoimmune condition, the onset of symptoms
consistent with the diagnosis existed before the first vaccination
(16,17). Theoretically, onset of autoimmune-disease-related
symptoms could be delayed well beyond vaccination and
postlicensure safety surveillance will be important to detect
any potential safety signals.

MenB-FHbp
MenB-FHbp consists of two purified recombinant lipidated
factor H binding protein (FHbp) antigens. One antigen from

TABLE 2. Potential cases and deaths prevented and cost-effectiveness of different strategies for MenB vaccination of adolescents and young
adults, including college students, by age — United States
Age at MenB series
11 yrs
16 yrs
18 yrs
College student

Cases prevented

Deaths prevented

15
28
29
9

2
5
5
1

NNV* to prevent case

NNV to prevent death

Cost per QALY (million $)

203,000
107,000
102,000
368,000

1,512,000
788,000
638,000
2,297,000

8.7
4.1
3.7
9.4

Abbreviations: MenB = meningococcal B vaccine; NNV = number needed to vaccinate; QALY = quality-adjusted life years.
Sources: Unpublished data, ACIP meeting June 2015. Key model assumptions were presented at the June 2015 ACIP meeting. Methods described in Shepard CW,
Ortega-Sanchez IR, Scott RD 2nd, Rosenstein NE. Cost-effectiveness of conjugate meningococcal vaccination strategies in the United States. Pediatrics
2005;115:1220–32.
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each FHbp subfamily (A and B) is included in the vaccine.
MenB-FHbp is licensed as a 3-dose series, with the second
and third doses administered 2 and 6 months, respectively,
after the first dose.
The immunogenicity and safety of MenB-FHbp in adolescents
and young adults were evaluated in seven clinical trials: five randomized controlled trials and two open-label studies (2–5,16,18)
(Pfizer, unpublished data). In a multicenter trial conducted in
the United States, persons aged 11–17 years were randomly
assigned to one of three groups: group 1 received MenB-FHbp
and quadrivalent human papillomavirus vaccine (4vHPV
[Gardasil, Merck and Co.]); group 2 received MenB-FHbp and
saline; and group 3 received 4vHPV and saline.
One month following the third dose, 81.0% (95% confidence interval [CI] = 78.0%–83.7%) of subjects in group 1
and 83.9% (CI = 81.1%–86.4%) of subjects in group 2 had a
composite response to all four strains tested (2,18). One month
following the second of 3 doses, approximately 50% of the
subjects in each study group had a composite response to all
four strains. In studies conducted in Europe among persons
aged 11–18 years, the hSBA responses in subjects who received
MenB-FHbp according to the same schedule were similar to
hSBA antibody responses in subjects in the U.S. study (3,18).
Evaluation of concomitant administration of MenB-FHbp
with vaccines routinely administered to adolescents in the
United States or Europe occurred in three trials. Subjects
received MenB-FHbp coadministered with 4vHPV, quadrivalent meningococcal conjugate vaccine (MenACWY
[Menactra, Sanofi Pasteur]), tetanus-diphtheria-acellular
pertussis vaccine (Tdap, [Adacel, Sanofi Pasteur]), or tetanusdiphtheria-acellular pertussis-inactivated polio (Tdap/IPV
[Repevax, Sanofi Pasteur]) vaccines, depending on the study
population in the trial. Except for the antibody response to
HPV type 18, no immunogenic interference was observed
for serogroup B or concomitant vaccine antigens (HPV
types 6, 11, 16, MenACWY, tetanus, diphtheria, pertussis, and
IPV antigens) when MenB-FHbp was administered concomitantly (4,5). For HPV type 18, noninferiority criteria (lower
bound of the CI of the geometric mean titer ratio >0.67) were
not met for the geometric mean titer ratio at 1 month after the
third 4vHPV dose (lower bound of the CI for the geometric
mean titer ratio was 0.62); however, for each HPV vaccine
type, ≥99% of subjects achieved seroconversion.
Antibody persistence through 48 months after dose 3 for
MenB-FHbp was evaluated in a clinical trial (Pfizer, unpublished data). The data demonstrate an initial rapid decline in
antibodies after vaccination followed by a flattening out of
the antibody curve at approximately 6 months after the third
dose. At 48 months, >50% of vaccinated subjects continued
to demonstrate hSBA titers greater than or equal to the lower

limit of quantification against three of the four strains tested
(Pfizer, unpublished data).
In seven clinical trials (2–5) (Pfizer, unpublished data), a
total of 9,808 subjects received at least 1 dose of MenB-FHbp;
four subjects reported seven serious adverse events that were
considered by the study investigator to be related (or possibly
related) to the vaccine.* All vaccine-related serious adverse
events resolved without sequelae. No increased risk for any
specific serious adverse event considered to be clinically significant was identified in any of the studies. No deaths were
considered to be related to MenB-FHbp. The most common
solicited adverse reactions observed in the 7 days after receipt of
MenB-FHbp in the clinical trials were pain at the injection site
(≥85%), fatigue (≥40%), headache (≥35%), myalgia (≥30%),
and chills (≥15%) (18).

MenB-4C
MenB-4C consists of three recombinant proteins (neisserial
adhesion A [NadA], factor H binding protein [FHbp] fusion
protein, and neisserial heparin binding antigen [NHBA] fusion
protein) and outer membrane vesicles (OMVs) containing
outer membrane protein PorA serosubtype P1.4. MenB-4C
is licensed as a 2-dose series, with doses administered at least
1 month apart, although in some studies, MenB-4C doses were
administered up to 6 months apart. No data are available following 3 doses of MenB-4C in a North American population.
The immunogenicity and safety of MenB-4C in adolescents
and young adults were evaluated in five clinical trials; three randomized controlled trials, one randomized uncontrolled trial,
and one immunogenicity extension study (6–10,17,19). In a
randomized controlled trial conducted in Chile, persons aged
11–17 years received 2 doses of MenB-4C 1, 2, or 6 months
apart. One month following the second dose, 90%–94%
of subjects had a composite response to all three strains
tested, depending on the vaccination schedule administered;
77%–94% of subjects had an hSBA titer of ≥1:4 against all
three strains tested at 18–24 months after the second dose,
depending on the vaccination schedule administered (9).
In a randomized controlled trial conducted in the United
Kingdom, a subset of enrolled subjects (university students
aged 18–24 years) received 2 doses of MenB-4C vaccine
1 month apart. One month following the second dose, 88%
(CI = 82%–93%) of subjects had a composite response to all
three strains tested; 66% (CI = 58%–72%) of the subjects had
a composite response to all three strains tested at 11 months
* The administration of the investigational vaccine and a serious adverse event
were considered reasonably related in time and the serious adverse event could
not be explained by causes other than exposure to the investigational vaccine.
The reported serious adverse events included pyrexia (1), vomiting (1),
vertigo (1), chills (1), headache (1), anaphylaxis (1), and neutropenia (1).
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after the second dose (8). In a randomized uncontrolled trial
conducted in Australia and Canada, persons aged 11–17 years
received 2 doses of MenB-4C 1 month apart. One month following the second dose, 63% (CI = 57%–68%) of subjects had
a composite response to all three strains tested (7,19).
In three clinical trials for which a control group was available, serious adverse events were assessed in 2,716 subjects who
received at least 1 dose of MenB-4C and for whom safety data
were collected through 6 months postvaccination (6,8,10). Five
serious adverse events were considered by the study investigator
to be related (or possibly related) to the vaccine.† Rates of serious adverse events were similar in the vaccine and the control
groups. In addition, information about serious adverse events
was collected during three vaccination campaigns in response
to three outbreaks of serogroup B meningococcal disease (at
two U.S. universities and in one region of Canada). A total of
59,091 participants in the vaccination campaigns received at
least 1 dose of MenB-4C. Three serious adverse events were
considered to be related (or possibly related) to the vaccine§;
all resolved with no sequelae (CDC and Novartis, unpublished
data). No deaths were considered to be related to MenB-4C
in the clinical trials or campaigns. The most common solicited adverse reactions observed in the 7 days after receipt of
MenB-4C in the clinical trials were pain at the injection site
(≥83%), myalgia (≥48%), erythema (≥45%), fatigue (≥35%),
headache (≥33%), induration (≥28%), nausea (≥18%), and
arthralgia (≥13%) (19). Immunogenicity and safety data
regarding MenB-4C when coadministered with vaccines
routinely administered to U.S. adolescents are not available.

Summary of ACIP Deliberations and Rationale
The available data suggest that MenB vaccines might be an
important step for controlling serogroup B meningococcal
disease. Although current data suggest they will protect against
the majority of currently circulating strains, these vaccines
are not expected to provide protection against disease caused
by all serogroup B strains circulating in the United States.
Additional studies assessing breadth of strain coverage are
ongoing, and ACIP will review results as they become available.
Immune responses following MenB vaccination in the studies described were evaluated after completion of the primary
† The

administration of the investigational vaccine and a serious adverse event
were considered reasonably related in time and the serious adverse event could
not be explained by causes other than exposure to the investigational vaccine.
The reported serious adverse events included tremor (1), dyspnea (1), acute
thyroiditis (1), and juvenile arthritis (2).
§ The administration of the investigational vaccine and a serious adverse event
were considered reasonably related in time and the serious adverse event could
not be explained by causes other than exposure to the investigational vaccine.
The reported serious adverse events included rhabdomyolysis (1), anaphylaxis (1),
and fever (1).
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Summary
What is currently recommended?
The Advisory Committee on Immunization Practices recommends routine vaccination of all adolescents aged 11–18 years
with a quadrivalent meningococcal conjugate vaccine
(MenACWY). A single dose should be administered at age 11 or
12 years with a booster dose at age 16 years for persons who
receive the first dose before age 16 years. Routine vaccination of
certain persons at increased risk for meningococcal disease with
MenACWY and serogroup B meningococcal (MenB) vaccine is
also recommended.
Why are the recommendations being modified now?
Two serogroup B meningococcal vaccines were recently
licensed by the Food and Drug Administration and approved for
use in persons aged 10–25 years. The evidence supporting the
use of MenB vaccines in adolescents and young adults was
evaluated using the Grading of Recommendations, Assessment,
Development, and Evaluation framework. The recommendation
was designated as Category B (recommended for individual
clinical decision making).
What are the new recommendations?
A MenB vaccine series may be administered to adolescents and
young adults aged 16–23 years to provide short-term protection against most strains of serogroup B meningococcal disease.
The preferred age for MenB vaccination is 16–18 years.

immunization series, but no data are available on vaccine
effectiveness against clinical disease endpoints or duration of
protection against clinical disease. On the basis of the limited
available data, no concerning patterns of serious adverse events
have been reported for MenB vaccines; additional safety data
and postlicensure safety surveillance data are needed and will
be reviewed by ACIP as they become available. In addition,
the potential impact of MenB vaccines on nasopharyngeal
carriage and herd protection is inconclusive, as is the potential
impact vaccine introduction might have on the population of
Neisseria meningitidis.
After reviewing the available data, ACIP supported consideration of vaccination of all adolescents rather than college
students only, primarily because an important number of
serogroup B meningococcal disease cases occurs in persons
aged 18–23 years who are not attending college, and vaccinating college students only is estimated to prevent the fewest
cases and deaths among all the options considered (Table 2).
However, ACIP also acknowledges the impact that cases and
outbreaks have on college campuses, both in terms of the cost
for vaccination campaigns in response to these outbreaks as
well as public concern. On the basis of the available antibody
persistence data, ACIP concluded that a preference to administer the MenB series in later adolescence exists, preferably at
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age 16–18 years, to maximize the likelihood that protection
would last into the highest age-related risk period.
The current low prevalence of disease, coupled with the fact that
important data for making policy recommendations for MenB
vaccines are not yet available, resulted in ACIP determining that
insufficient evidence exists to make a routine public health recommendation that all adolescents be vaccinated with MenB vaccine.
Given the seriousness of meningococcal disease and the availability
of licensed vaccines, ACIP agreed that sufficient evidence exists
to encourage individual clinical decision making.

Recommendations
A MenB vaccine series may be administered to adolescents
and young adults aged 16–23 years to provide short-term
protection against most strains of serogroup B meningococcal
disease. The preferred age for MenB vaccination is 16–18 years
(recommendation Category B).¶
MenB vaccine should either be administered as a 3-dose
series of MenB-FHbp or a 2-dose series of MenB-4C. The
two MenB vaccines are not interchangeable; the same vaccine
product must be used for all doses. On the basis of available
data and expert opinion, MenB-FHbp or MenB-4C may be
administered concomitantly with other vaccines indicated for
this age, but at a different anatomic site, if feasible.
No randomized controlled clinical trials have been conducted
to evaluate use of MenB vaccines in pregnant or lactating
women. Vaccination should be deferred in pregnant and lactating women unless the woman is at increased risk (20), and,
after consultation with her health care provider, the benefits
of vaccination are considered to outweigh the potential risks.
Additional information for health care providers and parents
can be found on the CDC website at http://www.cdc.gov/
meningococcal.
In February 2015, ACIP recommended routine use (recommendation Category A)** of MenB vaccines in certain groups
of persons at increased risk for serogroup B meningococcal disease, including during outbreaks of serogroup B meningococcal
disease (20). College campuses that have recently experienced
an outbreak of serogroup B meningococcal disease should
continue to follow the recommendations for use of MenB
vaccines in outbreak settings that recommend vaccination for
persons aged ≥10 years.

Precautions and Contraindications
Before administering MenB vaccines, health care providers
should consult the package insert for precautions, warnings,
¶ Category B recommendations are made for individual clinical decision making.
** Category A recommendations are made for all persons in an age- or risk-factorbased group.

and contraindications (18,19). Adverse events occurring
after administration of any vaccine should be reported to the
Vaccine Adverse Event Reporting System (VAERS). Reports
can be submitted to VAERS online, by fax, or by mail.
Additional information about VAERS is available by telephone
(1-800-822-7967) or online (https://vaers.hhs.gov).
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Notes from the Field
Mycobacterium chelonae Eye Infections
Associated with Humidifier Use in an Outpatient
LASIK Clinic — Ohio, 2015
Chris Edens, PhD1,2; Lauren Liebich, MPH3; Alison Laufer Halpin,
PhD1; Heather Moulton-Meissner, PhD1; Samantha Eitniear,
MPH-VPH3; Eric Zgodzinski, MPH3; Larry Vasko, MPH3; David
Grossman, MD3; Joseph F. Perz, DrPH1; Marika C. Mohr, MS4

Laser-assisted in situ keratomileusis (LASIK) eye surgery is
increasingly common, with approximately 600,000 procedures
performed each year in the United States (1). LASIK eye surgery
is typically performed in an outpatient setting and involves the use
of a machine-guided laser to reshape the lens of the eye to correct
vision irregularities (2). Clinic A is an ambulatory surgery center
that performs this procedure on 1 day each month. On February 5,
2015, the Toledo-Lucas County Health Department (TLCHD)
in Ohio was notified of eye infections in two of the six patients
who had undergone LASIK procedures at clinic A on January 9,
2015. The two patients experienced eye pain after the procedures
and received diagnoses of infection with Mycobacterium chelonae,
an environmental organism found in soil and water.
TLCHD staff visited clinic A on February 12, 2015, to review
procedures associated with LASIK surgery and identify possible
routes of transmission. None were immediately identified. Clinic
A subsequently performed 18 LASIK procedures on February 13,
2015. Two of these 18 patients experienced eye pain in early
March 2015 and were determined to have laboratory-confirmed
M. chelonae. These infections were reported to TLCHD, which
prompted clinic A to suspend all further LASIK procedures.
Discussions between CDC, TLCHD, and the Ohio Department
of Public Health focused on opportunities for water contamination
during the procedures. Although TLCHD staff reported that they
did not observe obvious lapses in medication preparation or hand
hygiene, they did note that clinic A used two humidifiers to maintain
the 40%–50% relative humidity recommended by the manufacturer
of the laser device used in the LASIK procedures (3). These cold air,
reservoir style, retail humidifiers were filled with tap water and located
in the operating room close to where patients were situated during
the procedures. Both humidifiers contained an internal reservoir
that held water during use. One of these devices used an ultrasonic
nebulizer to produce a mist, whereas the other passed dry inlet air
over a saturated wick. The misting humidifier had been purchased
in December 2014, and the evaporative device had been in use for
multiple years. CDC recommended collecting environmental samples
throughout the operating room, including from the water reservoir
and air output vents on each of the humidifiers.
Laboratory testing performed by CDC isolated M. chelonae
from the water reservoir of the misting humidifier. Pulsed-field

gel electrophoresis results indicated that three of the four
patient isolates and the humidifier isolate were indistinguishable; the isolate from the fourth patient was closely related
(>95% similarity). After this investigation, clinic A disposed
of both humidifiers and upgraded its centralized air handling
system to control both temperature and humidity in the operating room environment. No further cases have been reported
after the resumption of LASIK procedures in June 2015.
This outbreak was likely caused by the use of a consumer-grade
misting humidifier that had been contaminated with M. chelonae.
Because of the high level of humidity recommended by the manufacturers of the lasers used in LASIK procedures, it is possible that
additional LASIK clinics employ similar humidifier systems. Current
American National Standards Institute/American Society of Heating,
Refrigerating, and Air-Conditioning Engineers/American Society
for Healthcare Engineering (ANSI/ASHRAE/ASHE) ventilation
guidelines state that humidifiers should be located within air handling
units or ductwork, and that steam humidification should be used (4).
Additionally, current CDC environmental infection control guidance
states that use of reservoir style humidifiers is not permitted in health
care facilities (5,6). This outbreak highlights the potential risk associated with the use of misting humidifiers in health care settings, and
the need for diligent adherence to published recommendations for
patient care during all procedures performed in outpatient settings.
1Division of Healthcare Quality Promotion, National Center for Emerging
and Zoonotic Infectious Diseases, CDC; 2Epidemic Intelligence Service, CDC;
3Toledo-Lucas County Department of Public Health, Ohio; 4Ohio Department
of Public Health.
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Announcements
World Stroke Day — October 29, 2015
On October 29, 2015, for World Stroke Day, the World
Stroke Organization will continue its global campaign around
women and stroke. More women than men die from stroke
each year (1). Stroke is the second leading cause of death
in persons aged greater than 60 years and the third leading
cause of disability-adjusted life years (years of life lost because
of disability or early death) worldwide (2,3). In the United
States, more than 795,000 persons have a stroke each year and
approximately 75,000 women die from stroke annually (4).
Stroke is a primary cause of serious long-term disability (1).
High blood pressure is the leading risk factor for stroke (1).
CDC is working to promote stroke awareness and prevention through efforts that include the Paul Coverdell National
Acute Stroke Program (PCNASP), WISEWOMAN, and the
Million Hearts initiative. The PCNASP funds nine states to
measure, track, and improve the quality of stroke care.* The
WISEWOMAN program provides screening for heart disease
and stroke risk factors and lifestyle programs for low-income,
uninsured, or underinsured women in 21 states and tribal organizations.† Million Hearts, which is co-led by CDC and the
Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services, aims to prevent
1 million heart attacks and strokes by 2017.§
* Additional information available at http://www.cdc.gov/dhdsp/programs/
stroke_registry.htm.
† Additional information available at http://www.cdc.gov/wisewoman.
§ Additional information available at http://millionhearts.hhs.gov.
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CDC recommends that everyone know the signs and symptoms of stroke and call 9-1-1 immediately if they or someone
else might be having a stroke. Access to fast treatment is vital.
Engaging in healthy lifestyle behaviors such as exercising,
consuming more fruits and vegetables and less sodium, and
avoiding smoking might reduce the risk for experiencing a
stroke. Also, regularly checking and controlling blood pressure
can reduce the risk for stroke.
Additional information on World Stroke Day is available
at http://www.worldstrokecampaign.org/get-involved/worldstroke-day-2015.html. Additional information regarding
CDC’s efforts to address stroke is available at http://www.cdc.
gov/stroke/cdc_addresses.htm.
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Announcements
World Polio Day — October 24, 2015
October 24 is World Polio Day, which recognizes the global
progress made against a disease that at its height crippled over
100 children per week and now has been reduced to fewer than
100 cases per year. World Polio Day serves as a reaffirmation
of the global commitment to eradicate this childhood disease.
The concerted effort of the Global Polio Eradication
Initiative partners, including Rotary International, the World
Health Organization, the United Nations Children’s Fund,
CDC, and the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation, as well as
polio vaccinators and public health workers in the field, has
resulted in the World Health Organization announcing the
removal of Nigeria from the list of polio-endemic countries
in 2015, after a year without a reported wild poliovirus case
in that country. Pakistan and Afghanistan are the only remaining polio-endemic countries, with a total of 51 cases reported
between them this year as of October 14.

Recommendation Regarding Cardiovascular
Disease Prevention and Control from the
Community Preventive Services Task Force
The Community Preventive Services Task Force recently
posted new information about two recommendations:
1) “Self-Measured Blood Pressure Monitoring Interventions
for Improved Blood Pressure Control — When Used Alone,”
available at http://www.thecommunityguide.org/cvd/SMBPalone.html, and 2) “Self-Measured Blood Pressure Monitoring
Interventions for Improved Blood Pressure Control — When
Combined with Additional Support,” available at http://www.
thecommunityguide.org/cvd/SMBP-additional.html.
Established in 1996 by the U.S. Department of Health and
Human Services, the task force is an independent, nonfederal,
uncompensated panel of public health and prevention experts
whose members are appointed by the Director of CDC. The
task force provides information for a wide range of decision
makers on programs, services, and policies aimed at improving
population health. Although CDC provides administrative,
research, and technical support for the task force, the recommendations developed are those of the task force and do not
undergo review or approval by CDC.

MMWR / October 23, 2015 / Vol. 64 / No. 41

1179

Morbidity and Mortality Weekly Report

Errata
Vol. 64, No. 17

Vol. 64, No. 18

In the report, “Possible Sexual Transmission of Ebola
Virus — Liberia, 2015,” an author’s name was misspelled.
The author names should have read as follows: “Athalia
Christie, MIA1, Gloria J. Davies-Wayne, MPH2, Thierry
Cordier-Lassalle, DESS2, David J. Blackley, DrPH1, A. Scott
Laney, PhD1, Desmond E. Williams, MD, PhD1, Shivam A.
Shinde, MBBS2, Moses Badio, MSc3, Terrence Lo, DrPH1,
Suzanne E. Mate, PhD4, Jason T. Ladner, PhD4, Michael R.
Wiley, PhD4, Jeffrey R. Kugelman, PhD4, Gustavo Palacios,
PhD4, Michael R. Holbrook, PhD5, Krisztina B. Janosko,
MS5, Emmie de Wit, PhD5, Neeltje van Doremalen, PhD5,
Vincent J. Munster, PhD5, James Pettitt, MS5, Randal J.
Schoepp, PhD4, Leen Verhenne, MD6, Iro Evlampidou, MD6,
Karsor K Kollie, MPH3, Sonpon B. Sieh3, Alex Gasasira,
MBChB2, Fatorma Bolay, PhD7, Francis N. Kateh, MD3,
Tolbert G. Nyenswah, MPH3, Kevin M. De Cock, MD1”

In the report, “Controlling the Last Known Cluster of
Ebola Virus Disease — Liberia, January–February 2015,”
an author’s name was misspelled. The author names should
have read as follows: “Tolbert Nyenswah1, Mosoka Fallah1,
Sonpon Sieh1, Karsor Kollie1, Moses Badio1, Alvin Gray1,
Priscilla Dilah1, Marnijina Shannon1, Stanley Duwor1, Chikwe
Ihekweazu2, Thierry Cordier-Lassalle2, Shivam A. Shinde2,
Esther Hamblion2, Gloria Davies-Wayne2, Murugan Ratnesh2,
Christopher Dye2, Jonathan S. Yoder3, Peter McElroy3, Brooke
Hoots3, Athalia Christie3, John Vertefeuille3, Sonja J. Olsen3,
A. Scott Laney3, Joyce J. Neal3, Thomas R. Navin3, Stewart
Coulter3, Paran Pordell3, Terrence Lo3, Carl Kinkade3, Frank
Mahoney3 (Author affiliations at end of text)”
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QuickStats
FROM THE NATIONAL CENTER FOR HEALTH STATISTICS

Percentage of Residential Care Communities* Using Electronic Health
Records,†§ by Number of Beds — National Study of Long-Term Care Providers,
United States, 2014
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* Residential care communities refer to assisted living and similar residential places (e.g., personal care homes,
board and care homes, homes for the aged, and housing with service establishments). Nursing homes and
those with missing data were excluded.
† Respondents were asked, “An electronic health record is a computerized version of the resident’s health and
personal information used in the management of the resident’s health care. Other than for accounting or
billing purposes, does this residential care community use electronic health records?”
§ With 95% confidence intervals.

In 2014, 19% of residential care communities used electronic health records (EHRs). The larger communities were more likely
to use EHRs. The percentage of communities with >100 beds using EHRs (37%) was four times the percentage of communities
with four to 10 beds (9%).
Source: National Study of Long-Term Care Providers, 2014. Available at http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/nsltcp.htm.
Reported by: Eunice Park-Lee, PhD, hta8@cdc.gov, 301-458-4506; Vincent Rome, MPH; Christine Caffrey, PhD; Lauren Harris-Kojetin, PhD.
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